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REFORMING THE LAW-THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
LAURENCE M. JONES*
HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE RULE
For nearly three centuries the Rule Against Perpetuities
(hereinafter referred to as the Rule) has plagued the
courts and the legal profession. Beginning with the now
famous Duke of Norfolk's Case' and ending one hundred
and fifty years later with Cadell v. Palmer' the courts
slowly worked out the limits of the Rule which, as formu-
lated by Gray, reads:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest."'
As thus stated there is a disarming simplicity about the
Rule; it seems almost mechanical in its application. This,
however, is not so. Even the most cursory reading of the
cases and literature on the subject will indicate that the
Rule has been the source of a great deal of litigation. For
although the limits of the time period within which a
future interest must vest were fixed by the decision in
Cadell v. Palmer,4 the application of that period to particu-
lar cases, the determination of the lives in being, and
whether the interest is vested, within the meaning of the
Rule,5 have not always been obvious. The draftsman has
*A.B. 1930, J.D. 1932, State University of Iowa; LL.M. 1933, S.J.D.
1934, Harvard University; Professor of Law, University of Maryland
School of Law.
13 Ch. Oas. 1 (1682).
1 C1. & F. 372 (1833).3 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PXRPErurrITs (4th ed. 1942) § 201.
'Supra, n. 2.
5 1 have discussed the concepts Vf vested and contingent interests as
those concepts are used by the courts in solving problems, and will not
reconsider the subject in this article except to point out that the meaning
6f the term vested in perpetuities cases is not necessarily the same as that
given it when other problems are before the courts. See Jones, Vested and
Contingent Remainders, A Suggestion With Respect to Legal Method, 8
Md. L. Rev. 1 (1943). For another criticism of the distinction between
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been the primary victim, for it is he who, in the first
instance, must determine the effect which the Rule may
have on the dispositions he is making, and there are
many pitfalls along the way into which anyone except
the most experienced may stumble. The greatest criticism
of the Rule has been directed at the traps and technicalities
which are likely to snare the unwary but which may be
easily avoided by the expert. In fact, it is difficult to
find many cases where dispositions have been held invalid
for violating the Rule, in which the draftsman could not
have achieved his purpose and avoided the perpetuities
problem by a slight change in the wording of the instru-
ment.
This raises the issue of the basic purpose and philoso-
phy of the Rule. What is it trying to achieve, or, looking
at the problem from the other side, what is it trying to
prevent? Until comparatively recently there has been very
little consideration of these matters.6 The assumption has
been that the Rule is designed to promote free alienability
of interests in property and that the restriction against
remotely contingent interests will accomplish that result.
The assumption, however, has been questioned; several re-
cent articles have noted that present day dispositions con-
sist almost entirely of beneficial (equitable) interests under
trusts, and that such interests do not in fact withdraw the
property from commerce or restrict its alienability.7 This
is because of the powers given trustees to invest the corpus
of the trust, to sell specific property, and, in the case of
charitable trusts, the cy pres power of the courts to
alter provisions where a change of circumstances has taken
place. However, these powers are not unlimited, and to
some extent there is a restriction on the free use of the
property.
Similarly, the existence of several persons who by join-
ing together may convey good title to the property does
not avoid the impact of the Rule.' On the other hand,
vested and contingent interests as the test for applying the Rule see,
Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? 56 Mich.
L. Rev. 683, 887 (1958).
6 For a comparatively early discussion of the rationale of the Rule see
Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 Minn. L. Rev.
560 (1922).
' Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correc-
tives, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (1960) ; Schuyler, op. cit. supra, n. 5; Simes,
The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 707 (1955); Water-
bury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 Minn. L. Rev.
41 (1957).
8 At one time this was not clear but as the Rule developed the insistence
on vesting as the test, particularly by Gray, determined it. GuY, THE
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where one person has unlimited power to convey title,
future interests, however remote, do not violate the Rule.
This is illustrated by limitations following a fee tail where
the limitation is one which must vest if at all, at or before
the termination of the estate tail; and in fully revocable
inter vivos trusts where the period of the Rule is counted
from the death of the settlor rather than from the time
of the creation of the trust." Thus, the prevention of the
suspension of the power of alienation or the promotion
of free alienability is not the sole basis or explanation of
the Rule; at least in modern times this is no longer a
valid reason. The Rule, however, does prevent past gen-
erations (the so-called Dead Hand) from restricting, for too
long a period, the present generation in its control of the
property. It tends to insure that those who have the
present use and enjoyment of property shall also have the
control over it and the right to dispose of it as they think
fit.10 This is the justification for the continuance of the
Rule in modern times.
THE COMMON LAW RULE
What is the Rule and what are the criticisms which have
given rise to the recent trend toward statutory modifica-
tions of it? As stated by Gray it merely requires all in-
terests to vest, if at all, within a period of lives in being
and twenty-one years from the time the instrument
creating the interests takes effect. Actually there are three
measuring periods which may be used to determine the
validity of interests under the Rule. The first is the
period of lives in being; the second is a period of twenty-
one years in gross; and the third is a combination of these
two.
Beginning with the Duke of Norfolk's Case," it was
settled that an interest which must vest within a life in
being when the interest is created is not too remote. From
there the law moved slowly to the proposition that any
reasonable number of lives might be used as the meas-
uring period, and if the interest will vest by the time of
RULE AGAINST PERPETurrIs (4th ed. 1942) §§ 268-278.4; MoRRIs AND
LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1956) 2-3.
"As regards limitations following a fee tail see GRAY, op. Cit. supra
n. 8, §§ 443453; MORRIS AND LEACH, op. cit. supra n. 8, 189-190. With
respect to revocible trusts see GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 8, § 524.1; 1 SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS (2nd ed. 1956) § 62.10. Generally as to the effect
of destructibility. See 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 373.
,0 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955) 55-63; Simes, The
Policy Apainst Perpetuities, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 707 (1955).1 13 Ch. Cas. 1 (1682).
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the death of the last survivor it is valid. Thus, a gift
contingent upon survivorship of children and grand-
children living at the time of the testator's death is
valid.12  Indeed the measuring lives need not be per-
sons connected with the limitations or the conveyor
in any way. Of course they must either be selected
for that purpose or it must be possible to say that
the limitations will, with absolute certainty, be deter-
mined within the period of the Rule; thus there must in
a sense be some relationship between the measuring lives
and the limitations. The famous Royal Lives clause is an
illustration of the use of a selected group of persons, who
are in no way connected with the testator or his limita-
tions, as the measuring lives. 13 In such instances the lives
selected must be definitely defined and not so large that
it is impossible for the court to locate them. 4 Gifts are
also valid where there are no persons selected as measuring
lives and where there are no life interests created if it is
possible to determine that the interests created will vest
within the lifetimes of ascertained persons, as in gifts to
the testator's own grandchildren. 15
The second measuring period which may be used is a
period of twenty-one years in gross. Commencing as the
period of the minority of the ultimate taker, this was
allowed on the theory that it did not restrain alienation
any longer than the law would because of the infancy of
the taker. 6 This soon developed into a period of twenty-
one years and finally into an absolute period of years
unconnected with lives or infancy. 17 Where it is impossible
12Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112 (1805). The rationale for this
proposition is 'that the life of the survivor is but one life, or as "Twisden
used to say, the candles were all lighted at once." Scattergood v. Edge, 1
Salk. 229 (1692) ; Dove v. Wyndham, 1 Mod. 50 (1681) ; 4 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1944) § 374(a). However, a similar clause making a gift
contingent upon survivorship of the children and grandchildren of the
grantor or settlor under an inter vivos instrument is bad. Ryan v. Ward,
192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949).
In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243.
14 See the discussion in In re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All E.R. 274 (Ch.)
as to the possible limits on such clauses; also SIMES AND SmITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed. 1956) § 1223. See In re Moore, [1901]
1 Ch. 936 for a case which exceeded the limits.
I B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor, 325 Mass. 201, 89 N.E. 2d 777
(1950) ; Simes and Smith, op. Cit. supra n. 14, § 1223; 4 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1944) § 374, comment j. Compare In re Helme's Estate, 95
N.J. Eq. 197, 123 A. 43 (1923) an obviously erroneous decision.
11Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. Temp. Talb. 228 (1736); GRAY, op. cit.
supra n. 8, §§ 171-4.
17Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372 (1833); GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 8,§§ 176-85. The extension of the Rule to include the period of twenty-one
years may have been accidental. Code v. Sewell, 2 H. L. Cas. 186 (1848),
aff'g 4 D. & War. 1 (1842) ; GRAY, supra §§ 186-8.
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to find any related lives, the period of the Rule thus be-
comes the period of twenty-one years. The grant of an
option to purchase which is not limited to the grantee, or
a clause which will cause title to shift from one taker to
another upon the happening of an uncertain event must
be limited to a period of twenty-one years to be valid."8
The third possible measuring period is merely a com-
bination of the other two, a period of lives in being plus
twenty-one years. This represents the maximum period
allowed by the Rule during which future interests may
remain contingent; any contingent limitation extending
beyond this is invalid. The most typical limitation of this
type is a gift to a person for life followed by a remainder
to his children contingent on their attaining the age of
twenty-one. 9 Similarly a gift to the grandchildren of the
testator who attain twenty-one is valid,20 or a gift to
persons not to be determined until twenty-one years after
the death of the last of a selected group of lives.2'
In addition to the measuring period of lives in being
and twenty-one years, periods of gestation may be in-
cluded for in applying the Rule persons are considered
as in being once conception has taken place.22 In the
Thellusson Case23 two periods of gestation were involved,
one preceding the determination of the lives and one at
the termination of the lives. Professor Gray proposed a
18 Options: London & South Western Railway Co. v. Gomm, L.R. 20
Ch. Div. 562 (1882); Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S.E.
524 (1907); 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) §§ 393-4. But options in
leases permitting the lessee to renew the lease or acquire the fee are
valid providing they do not extend beyond the term of the lease. Hol-
lander v. Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908); SIMES AND
SMITH, op. cit. supra n. 14, §§ 12434; Abbott, Leases and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 27 Yale L.J. 878 (1918); 4 RESTATEMENT, PaOPERY
(1944) § 395. Executory interests: McMahon v. Saint Paul's Ref. Church,
196 Md. 125, 75 A. 2d 122 (1950) ; Inst. for Savings v. Roxbury Home for
Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923) ; Proprietors of the
Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 GRAY 142 (Mass. 1855).
This proposition is inherent in the statement of the basic rule that
all interests must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life
in being; the dicta in accord are innumerable although most cases deal
with limitations violating the rule. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Baltimore v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; Billingsley v.
Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934) ; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)
§ 386, illus. 3.
Otterback v. Bohrer, 87 Va. 548, 12 S.E. 1013 (1891) ; 4 RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1944) § 374, comment j. Compare In re Helme's Estate, 95 N.J.
Eq. 197, 123 A. 43 (1923).
Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908) ; In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243.
2 This is considered as true whether or not it is a benefit to the individual
concerned. Equitable Trust Co. v. McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 A. 203
(1933).
211 Yes. 112 (1805).
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hypothetical case in which three periods are involved. 4
However, in applying the Rule only actual periods of gesta-
tion are included, and these have never been extended
into an absolute period of months in addition to the
lives in being and twenty-one years, although there is some
dicta in a few cases hinting at such a result.25
The application of these periods to specific dispositions
gives rise to many problems some of which are the result
of the courts' insistence that if under any possibility a
limitation might violate the Rule it is invalid. This princi-
ple is applied relentlessly and has caused much of the
criticism of the Rule. In many instances a remote and
improbable possibility, existing at the time the interest is
created, is held to offend the Rule even though at the time
the case is decided it is known the event will not occur. The
Unborn Widow26 and Administrative Contingency27 situa-
tions are examples of this type. Similar problems occur
in the case of options which are not specifically limited to
named persons or times." Although all of these difficulties
may be easily eliminated by good draftsmanship, the care-
less or perhaps ignorant scrivener is likely to find him-
self in trouble.2 9 The ultimate victims, of course, are the
innocent legatees and devisees who fail to receive the
property which the testator intended them to have.30
Another principle which causes much difficulty is the
irrebuttable presumption of the possibility of issue which
the courts apply in perpetuities cases. This may cause
trouble by bringing persons not in being into the group of
measuring lives. Thus, in the case of gifts for life to
24 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST P rurrIEs (4th ed. 1942) § 222.
25 Fitzpatrick v. Mer.-Safe etc. Co., 220 Md. 534, 155 A. 2d 702 (1959);
Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; Ibid. Supra,
n. 5.
21 Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944); SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) § 1293(c).
7In re Campbell's Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P. 2d 22 (1938);
Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Ill. 45, 170 N.E. 699 (1930); SIMES AND SMITH
op. cit. supra n. 26, § 1293 (d).
21 See authorities ciited "Options", supra n. 18.
29 For discussions of the typical problem situations and suggestions as
to how to avoid them through good draftmanship, see SIMES AND SMITH,
op. cit. supra n. 26, §§ 1293-7; Leach and Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard
Saving Clause to Avoid Violations of the Rule, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1141
(1961). The Clause proposed in the last article seems somewhat com-
plicated and gives very broad powers to the designated trustee to make
over the challenged limitations; this approach may be unacceptable to
many persons.
O It is entirely possible that the draftsman, whose poor workmanship
resulted in the violation of the Rule and the loss of the bequest or devise
by 'the intended beneficiary, may be liable to the latter for the amount
lost because of the violation. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P. 2d 685 (Cal.
1961) indicating such a possibility.
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the children of a living person followed by contingent
gifts over, or gifts to the grandchildren of a living person,
the ultimate dispositions violate the Rule because of the
possibility of afterborn children .3 Or it may be that the
possibility of future issue may allow the group of eventual
takers to increase for too long a time as in the case of
class gifts where all members of the class will not be
determined within the period of the Rule.2 This raises
another question concerning the rules for determining
when a class gifts vests - will the courts split the class?
The answer has been no. A similar problem is presented
where the stated contingency involves several possibilities;
again the courts have refused to split the contingencies
unless the draftsman has stated them in the alternative.34
In fact, the concept of vested as distinguished from con-
tingent interests is dependent on considerations foreign
to the Rule and seems a poor test for its application.3 5 For
example, in the cases of possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry the English and American courts have differed
as to whether such interests are vested within the meaning
of the Rule. 6
In applying the Rule to powers of appointment there
are two problems, one involving the creation of powers
and the other their exercise. Any power which cannot
possibly be exercised within the period of the Rule is
bad; on the other hand some powers which may be exer-
cised beyond the period of the Rule are valid.3 7 The sec-
ond problem involves the exercise of powers of appoint-
ment. Interests created by the donee when he exercises
21 Marty v. First Nat'l Bk. of Balbo., 209 Md. 210, 120 A. 2d 841 (1956) ;
Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949) ; Vickery v. Maryland
Trust Oo., 188 Md. 178, 52 A. 2d 100 (1947) ; Heald v. Heald, 56 Md. 300
(1881); GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 24, § 370; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1944) § 371, illus. 2, § 383, illus. 1.
1 Gifts to a class contingent upon the members reaching an age greater
than twenty-one, or gifts over on death of a member prior to attaining an
age greater than twenty-one are typical. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan,
169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 24, §§ 369, 372.
13 Goldberg v. Erich, 142 Md. 544, 121 A. 365 (1923) ; Bowerman v. Taylor,
126 Md. 203, 94 A. 652 (1915); Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363 (1817);
SIMES AND SmrTH, op. cit. supra n. 26, § 1265. For a critical analysis of
the Rule as applied to class gifts, see Leach, The Rule Against Per-
petuitie8 and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
U Hancock v. Watson, [1902] A. C. 14; Proctor v. The Bishop of Bath
and Wells, 2 H. Bl. 358 (1794); SimEs AND SmITH, Op. cit. supra n. 26,§ 1257.
See supra, n. 5; also GRAY, THE RuLFE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed.
1942) § 110.1, n. 1.
I McMahon v. Saint Paul's Ref. Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A. 2d 122 (1950);
MORRIS AND LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1956) 203-11.
87Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of Appoint-
ment in Maryland, 18 Md. L. Rev. 93, 96-9, 108-9 (1958).
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the power must vest within the period allowed by the
Rule. However, in applying the Rule to powers of appoint-
ment, all interests created by the exercise of a power, other
than a power presently exercisable, must vest within the
period allowed by the Rule measuring from the time the
power was created by the donor.38 In the case of powers
presently exercisable the interest is valid if it will vest
within the period of the Rule measuring from the time the
donee exercises the power.3 9 These rules raise difficult
problems in Maryland because of the peculiar interpre-
tation the Court of Appeals has placed on general powers
in this state. Thus, it is doubtful whether the exception
just mentioned is applicable in Maryland.40
There are also some problems in applying the Rule to
trusts. It is settled that the beneficial interests under a
trust must obey the Rule and, therefore, are invalid if they
will not vest within the period allowed by the Rule.4'
However, whether the Rule imposes a limit upon the dura-
tion of trusts or whether interests which vest within the
period of the Rule may continue in trust beyond that
period is not so clear. Although it is now generally ac-
cepted that private trusts may continue beyond the period
of the Rule, there have been decisions opposed, and it is
sufficiently doubtful that careful draftsmen advise against
such.42 It is agreed that charitable trusts may be created
to last indefinitely.43
- Id., 100-1, 109.
"Ibid.
Id., 108-10.
"Turner v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 148 Md. 371, 129 A. 294 (1925);
Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094 (1914); GRAY, op. oit.
supra n. 35, §§ 322-3; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) Ch. 26, Topic 2,
Limitations Involving the Duration of Trusts or of Powers of a Trustee,
Introductory Note.
" 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 378. The early Maryland cases
held that a trust which might continue for more than the period of the
Rule was invalid, but these have been overruled by later cases. Jones,
supra n. 37, 93-4; GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 35, §§ 234-5, 245.2 where the
Maryland cases are cited and discussed in detail; infra at 282-283. By
terminating the trust and vesting all interests within the period allowed
by the Rule, one can guard against the possibility a court might construe
a remote interest as contingent and invalidate it.
34 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 380 (2) (a). On this point also
the Maryland law was unorthodox and in doubt for many years. See,
GRAY, loc. cit. supra n. 42. However, subsequent statutes seem to have
corrected the situation and validated perpetual charitable trusts. Infra
at 282. In the absence of statutes authorizing them, so-called "Honorary
Trusts" and trusts for unincorporated associations may be invalid unless
restricted to the period allowed by the Rule. SIMEs AND SMITH, FUTURs
INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) §§ 1394-5. RESTATEMENT, supra §§ 379-80. See infra
at 283, n. 77 for Maryland statutes providing for the creation and mainte-
nance of private burial lots.
276
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Two other closely related problems should be men-
tioned. The first is that of restraints on alienation in the
form of spendthrift restrictions in a trust or provisions
for the accumulation of income. Are such limitations in-
valid if they may exceed the period of the Rule? Al-
though the Rule is not a restriction against the suspension
of the power of alienation, it now seems settled that there
is a policy against the accumulation of income for a period
exceeding that of the Rule.44 Whether this is an applica-
tion of the Rule to accumulations or another rule in which
the measuring period is the same as that for perpetuities
is not too clear, although the current theory is that the
Rule Against Accumulations is distinct from the Rule
Against Perpetuities.45 Similarly spendthrift restrictions
in a trust may be bad even though all the interests vest
within the period of the Rule if the trust is allowed to
continue beyond that period.46 Again, the theory upon
which this is based is not settled. The second problem is
that of settlement options under life insurance policies.
Insofar as the proceeds of insurance are made payable to
a trustee under an insurance trust agreement, the normal
rules relating to trusts are applicable, and it is clear that
the interests of the beneficiaries are subject to the Rule.
But where the proceeds are left with the insurance com-
pany a trust relationship is not involved; it is merely a
contract for the payment of the debt owed to the bene-
ficiaries in installments, and the Rule is not applicable.
However, for some purposes such agreements have been
treated as analogous to trusts and similar rules applied.48
This leaves the validity of settlement options where the
payments may continue beyond the period allowed by the
Rule in doubt.
"Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 A. 161 (1929); SIMES AND
SMITH, op. cit. supra n. 43. §§ 1461-5; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)
§ 441. Accumulations which do not exceed the period of the Rule are
valid. Gertman v. Burdick, 123 F. 2d 924 (1941) ; Thellusson v. Woodford,
11 Ves. 112 (1805).
Gertman v. Burdick, supra, n. 44; SIMES AND SMIT, loc. cit. supra,
n. 44; RESTATEMENT, supra, n. 44.
4See GRISWOLD, 'SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947) §§ 290-6; 1 ScOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS (2d ed. 1956) § 62.10 (3) p. 554: 1 RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS 2d (1959) § 62, comment p. all indicating that such a restriction
is valid. But compare 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 381.
'7 See Holmes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 N.Y. 106, 41
N.E. 2d 909 (1942) involving the New York statutory rule against
perpetuities rather than the common law rule.
"Michaelson v. Sokolove, 169 Md. 529, 182 A. 458 (1936) upholding a
spendthrift provision in a settlement option on analogy to a trust.
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STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE
The above review of the Common Law Rule Against
Perpetuities, its development and application, indicates
some of the difficulties which have caused resentment
against it. Attempts to reform the Rule go back a long way
and have consisted mainly in statutes directed at specific
evils. Thus, following the decision in the Thellusson
Case49 the English Parliament enacted a statute limiting the
period during which income may be accumulated.5 ° And
in the Law of Property Act of 1925 a provision was in-
cluded reducing to age twenty-one any limitation con-
tingent on attaining a greater age which violated the Rule.51
Suggestions for more general reforms had been made, and
in 1830 the New York Revised Statutes made extensive
changes in the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities
which in effect limited the permissible period in that state
to two lives plus a period of minority in some instances. 2
These statutes were copied in several other states but
did not prove very successful and have been substantially
modified or repealed.5 3 These early attempts to reform
the law relating to perpetuities gave rise to much litiga-
tion and controversy and discouraged further statutory
changes for many years.
However, about ten years ago a new reform move-
ment began, resulting in the enactment of statutes in
several states which make substantial changes in the im-
pact of the Rule on limitations which violate it. An
article by Professor Leach published in 195211 is generally
given credit for beginning this new movement, although it
actually began five years earlier with the enactment of
the Pennsylvania Estates Act of 1947.11 This act adopted
what has been termed the "wait and see" principle; that is,
in determining the validity of limitations under the Rule,
the court waits until the actual events happen or until
-11 Ves. 112 (1805).
U39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800).51 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 163.
3 New York Rev. Stats. c. 1, Tit. 2, §§ 14-21, 23, 24, 36-40 and c. 4, Tit. 4.
3 Those states were Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. For a discussion of these statutes
see, 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) Appendix on The Statutory Rules
Against Perpetuities, Ch. A und 1B; SIMES AND SMITH, OP. Cit. supra n. 43,
§§ 1415-36.
11 Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,
65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952) ; a similar article was published in England
under the title Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68
L. Q. Rev. 35 (1952).
U PUBDON'S PENNA. STATS. ANNO., §§ 301.4 and 301.5.
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it becomes apparent that the interest cannot vest within
the allowed period rather than considering the possibilities
at the time the interest is created. There is no change
in the measuring period of lives in being plus twenty-one
years, but merely the substitution of actual events for
possibilities in determining the validity of interests. This
approach overcomes one of the criticisms of the Rule at
the expense of delaying the determination of the validity
of all limitations until the expiration of the full period
allowed under the Rule. Whether this delay will prove
more burdensome than the evils it is designed to correct
remains to be seen; only time and the process of litigation
can provide the answer.56
The Law Reform Committee in England made a report
in 1956 in which it recommended the adoption of the "wait
and see" principle along with several other specific re-
forms designed to correct some of the abuses resulting
from the traditional application of the Rule. 7 For exam-
ple, it was recommended that there be a presumption,
rebuttable by evidence to the contrary, that a woman of
fifty-five or over is incapable of bearing a child, that a
male or female who has not attained the age of fourteen
is incapable of procreating or bearing a child, and that
medical evidence should be admissible to estabilsh that
a male or female of any age is incapable of procreating or
bearing a child. It was further recommended that class
gifts should not be invalidated by the failure of the limita-
tion to some only of the members, but that the limitation
should take effect as to those members of the class who
comply with the perpetuity rule; and that any limitation
which would be void solely by reason of the possibility of
some person marrying a spouse who is not a life in being
should take effect as if the spouse were confined to a
person who was born before the date of the limitation.
Although no general change was proposed for the per-
61 There are some who have anticipated the results and forsee disaster
for the "wait and see" principle. Bordwell, Perpetuities From the Stand-
point of the Draftsman, 11 Rutgers L. Rev. 429 (1956) ; Mechem, Further
Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 965 (1959); Simes, 18 the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The
"Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953) ; Sparks, A Decade
of Transition in Future Interests, 45 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1959). But there
are others who have no such fears. Oohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-And-See
Perpetuity Doctrine - New Kernels From Old Nutshells, 28 Temple L. Q.
321 (1955) ; Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvania! 108 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 1124 (1960). As the student of two of the critics (Bordwell
and Mechem) and the teacher of one (Sparks), I perhaps should be
opposed to the current reforms, but I am not!
17 LAW REFORm ComMXITEEm, Fou&TH REPORT (1956).
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petuity period it was recommended that the instrument
might provide for an absolute period of eighty years in
substitution for the Common Law period.58
A variant of the "wait and see" type of statute has been
enacted in Massachusetts and several other states,59 by
which, when applying the Rule to interests limited to take
effect after one or more life estates or lives of persons in
being when the period of the Rule commences to run,
the validity of the interest is determined on the basis of
the facts existing at the termination of the life estates or
lives. In addition some of these statutes contain other
provisions designed to correct specific abuses in the appli-
cation of the Rule, but none of them goes as far as the
English recommendations.
Another type of statute, found in a few states, com-
bines the "wait and see" principle with what has been
called the "cy pres" approach.60 In these statutes the court
is given the power to reform any interest which might
violate the Rule so as to approximate, within the limits of
the Rule, the intention of the creator; in determining
whether an interest violates the Rule actual rather than
possible events are considered. Such statutes are obviously
based on the "cy pres" principle as applied in the case of
charitable trusts and perhaps can trace their beginnings
back to the famous decision of Chief Justice Doe in Edgerly
v. Barker.1 It is interesting to note that the Law Reform
Committee in making its report considered the possibility
of such an approach but rejected it, saying:
"We have considered whether the court should be
given a general power to remodel limitations which
infringe the rule, and give effect to the nearest possi-
ble approximation to the intention of the settlor or
testator that will comply with the rule. The impact
of such a cy-pres doctrine . . .would not be easy to
foretell, and the jurisdiction would be difficult in its
exercise. We are far from convinced that the com-
plexities inherent in such a vague and uncertain
Id., 9.
196 MASS. LAWS ANNO., Ch. 184A, §§ 1-6; CONN. STAT. ANNo. (1958)
Tit. 45, §§ 45-95 thru 45-99; MAINE REV. STATS., Ch. 160 (Cum. Supp.
1959) § 27-33. The Mkaryland statute, discussed infra at 283-289, is also
modeled after the Massachusetts act.
87 VT. STATS. ANNO. (1959) Tit. 27, §§ 501-503; Ky. REV. STATS. ANNO.
(1962 Cum. Issue) §§ 381.215 thru 381.223; WASH. REv. CODE, Tit. 11,,
§§ 11.98.010 thru 11.98.050.
66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
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jurisdiction would be outweighed by any practical
advantage. '62
New York, after abandoning its original statutory scheme
and adopting what is approximately the Common Law
measuring period, has attempted to prevent the abuses of
the Rule by a statute designed to correct individual in-
stances in which it is considered the Rule has worked
badly.e3
THE MARYLAND LAW (COMvION AND UNCOMMON)
With a few notable exceptions, the Court of Appeals
has applied the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities
in orthodox fashion. Maryland cases have been cited in
the above discussion of the development and application of
the Rule and no attempt will be made here to review them
in detail. It is important, however, to note those instances
in which the Maryland cases have differed from the gen-
erally accepted view or in which there is some doubt
whether that view will be followed. Because of the pe-
culiar and limited interpretation of general powers of ap-
pointment in Maryland, it is questionable whether the
usual rules applicable to such powers will be applied in
Maryland or whether the more restrictive rules appli-
cable to special powers will be followed. For example, a
general power presently exercisable is normally held valid
if it is possible that it may be exercised within the period
of the Rule even though it is not certain that it will be
exercised within that period.14 All other powers must be
so limited that it is certain they will be exercised within
the period allowed by the Rule.65 In Maryland it is doubt-
ful whether the exception relating to general powers will
be recognized.66 There are similar doubts regarding the
rules governing the exercise of general powers presently
exercisable.6 7
The Court of Appeals has also shown less inclination
than other courts to split a gift to a class into sub-classes
where such a technique might result in avoiding the appli-
2LAw REORM CoMMrrrE, FoURTH REPORT (1956) 30.
6340 MdKixNEY's CoNsoL. LAWS AwNO. (1945) §§ 11, 11-a & b; 49
MCKINNEY'S CONSoL. LAWS ANNO. (Cum. Supp. 1962) §§ 42, 42-b & c, 178;
the changes were made in 1958 and 1960.
Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of Appoint-
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cation of the Rule.6 As previously indicated, there is some
dicta in Maryland treating the period of gestation as an
absolute period of a stated number of months rather than
a factual matter to be considered only in those instances in
which it is actually involved.69 However, it is believed
these dicta will not be followed.
Another instance in which the Maryland law originally
differed from the normal application of the Rule was in
relation to trusts. It is conceded that the beneficial inter-
ests under a trust must vest within the period allowed by
the Rule, but following the decision by the Supreme Court
in the Baptist Case7" the Court of Appeals held there was
no special law relating to charitable trusts in Maryland
and that such trusts were void because of the lack of
definite beneficiaries and because they violated the Rule.7'
Although the Supreme Court subsequently reversed its
early decision and upheld charitable trusts, the Court of
Appeals has never changed its position, and insofar as
charitable trusts are valid in Maryland they are dependent
on various statutory provisions which will be discussed
below.
With respect to private trusts, the Court not only re-
quired that all interests must vest within the period al-
lowed by the Rule, but also took the position that any
trust which might continue beyond the period allowed by
the Rule was invalid. 2 These cases were subsequently
overruled and the law of perpetuities as it is now applied
to private trusts in Maryland seems to be completely
8 The general rule is that both the maximum and minimum membership
of the class must be determined within the period allowed by the Rule,
and, if it is possible that any member may not qualify within that period,
the gift fails as to all members of the class. See supra at 275, n. 33. How-
ever, where the class is split into sub-classes within the period allowed by
the Rule, the courts in some instances may uphbld the gifts to some of
the sub-classes even though the gifts to others fail. Turner v. Safe Dep.
& Trust Co., 148 Md. 371, 129 A. 294 (1925) ; Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md.
203, 94 A. 652 (1915) ; Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
140 F. 2d 759 (1944); 'Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Second
Bank-State Street Trust Co., 335 Mass. 407, 140 N.E. 2d 201 (1957);
Oattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372 (Ch. 1853); SIMEs AN)D SMITH, FuTuRE
INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) § 1267; 4 RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY (1944) § 389.
For the form of limitations which will permit a court to split the gift
into sub-classes, see RESTATEMENT, supra, Comments b and c; compare
Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949) where the Court of
Appeals failed to find the necessary splitting.
Supra at 274, n. 25.
7 Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
7'For a thorough review of the history and development of the law
'of charitable trusts in Maryland see, Howard, Charitable trusts in Mary-
land, 1 Md. L. Rev. 105 (1937).
Supra, n. 42.
1962] THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 283
orthodox.7 3 Closely related to the problems involving
trusts is the question of the validity of spendthrift restric-
tions in insurance settlement options. The one Maryland
case74 involving such a provision upheld the restrictions on
analogy to spendthrift trusts; this, as previously indi-
cated, casts some doubt on their validity if they exceed
the period of the Rule.75
In view of the peculiarities of the Maryland law, it
was inevitable that statutory reforms should be enacted
to correct some of the situations noted above. This is
especially true in the case of charitable trusts where donors
were limited in making gifts to existing charitable corpo-
rations. Therefore, in 1888 the legislature passed a statute
providing that no devise or bequest for charitable uses
shall be held void provided the will contains directions
for the formation of a corporation to take the same and
such corporation is formed within twelve months after
the probate of the will or the termination of any prior
life estates. 76 Without such a statute gifts to corporations
to be formed violate the Rule because of the possibility the
corporation might not be organized within the period
allowed by the Rule. After the statute gifts to charitable
corporations in existence or to be formed were valid but
unincorporated charitable trusts remained invalid until
further legislation was enacted. In 1906 two more stat-
utes were passed validating the devise or conveyance of
burial lots, and the bequest of sums, not exceeding $5,000,
in trust for the care and maintenance of such lots or
graves.77 Again in 1908 another statute was passed which
expressly exempted from the operation of the Rule any
contingent gift over from a charitable corporation to an
individual.78  Such executory interests designed to con-
trol the use of the preceding charitable gift usually are
held to violate the Rule.79
The next statute to be enacted apparently was intended
to establish in Maryland the law of charitable trusts as
1 Jones, supra, n. 64, 93-4.
7Michaelson v. Sokolove, 169 Md. 529, 182 A. 458 (1936).
15 Supra at 277.
708 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 357.
77 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93 §§ 345, 358.
78 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93 § 348. At Common Law the gift over is
valid providing both the first and second takers are charities. GAY, THE
RULE AGAINST PEMPrUITIES (4th ed. 1942) § 597.
7 McMahon v. Saint Paul's Ref. Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A. 2d 122
(1950). But see 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §§ 124-5 establishing proce-
dures by which educational or charitable corporations may be required to
comply with such restrictions and conditions even though the gifts over
are too remote under the Rule.
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applied by the English courts.8 0 Although it did not en-
tirely succeed in so doing, it did expressly provide that
"it shall be no objection to the validity or enforceability
of such trusts or of such gift, deed, bequest, devise, etc.,
* . . that such trusts or the limitations under such settle-
ment are limited to extend for a perpetual or indefinite
period."'" This definitely removes the previous objection
that perpetual charitable trusts violated the Rule.
There are two other statutes relating to perpetuities
which should be mentioned. The first does nothing more
than prohibit the creation of a perpetuity. 2 This appar-
ently has had no impact on the course of the law and is
nothing more than an attempt to codify the Common Law
restriction. The other statute exempts profit sharing and
pension trust plans from the operation of the Rule. 3 The
popularity of such plans in recent years has raised some
doubts as to their possible violation of the Rule, and as
a result statutes of this type have been enacted in many
states.
This then brings us to the 1960 statute 4 which adopts
a limited "wait and see" approach. There are six sub-
sections in the act the first of which provides:
"Basis of determination of validity of interest. In
applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in
real or personal property limited to take effect at
or after the termination of one or more life estates
in, or lives of, persons in being when the period of
said rule commences to run, the validity of the in-
terest shall be determined on the basis of facts exist-
ing at the termination of such one or more life estates
or lives. In this section an interest which must ter-
minate not later than the death of one or more
persons is a 'life estate' even though it may terminate
at an earlier date."8 5
This is identical with the Massachusetts statute. 6 What
does it mean? What changes will it effect? How will it
80 See, Howard, 8upra, n. 71, 123-5.
812 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 195. Other statutes have been enacted to
give the courts the cy pres powers exercised by the English equity courts.
2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §§ 127 and 196 (Uniform Charitable Trusts
Administration Act) ; the latter statute was applied and upheld in Miller
v. Mer.-Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 224 Md. 380, 168 A. 2d 184 (1961).
828 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 347.
8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 197.
"' 8 MD. CODE (Cun. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A.
58 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (a).
"6 MASs. LAWS ANno., Ch. 184A, § 1.
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be applied? These are the questions which must be
answered, but, unfortunately, the process of litigation
takes time; however, some predictions may be made.
This provision applies only in cases in which the interest is
preceded by a life estate or in which the lives of some
persons are used as the measuring period upon the ter-
mination of which the limitation is to take effect. It does
not in any way change the measuring period of the Rule.
In cases to which it is applicable the facts as they exist
at the termination of the life estate or lives are considered
in applying the Rule, rather than the possibilities which
might occur at the time the interest was created. The
following examples illustrate the difference between the
traditional and statutory approaches.
(1) X to A for life, remainder to the children of A who
attain 25.
If A is alive when this instrument takes effect, the possi-
bility of afterborn children makes the remainder void
according to the Common Law application of the Rule ir-
respective of whether any such children are born or not.
Under the statute if at A's death he has had no afterborn
children, or if all of his children, including those born
after the instrument took effect, are over four years old
the limitation is valid.
(2) X to A for life, then to the children of A for their
lives, remainder to the grandchildren of A.
Here again the possibility of afterborn children invalidates
under the traditional interpretation of the Rule, the gift
to the grandchildren, but under the statute, if there are
no such children born to A, the remainder is valid.
(3) X to A for life, then to A's widow, if he leaves one
surviving him, for her life, and upon the death of
A and his widow remainder to such of their chil-
dren as survive them.
The remainder to the surviving children would be bad at
Common Law because of the possibility A's widow might
be a person not born at the time the instrument took effect,
but under the statute we can tell at the time of A's death
whether his widow was in being at the time the instru-
ment became effective and thus sustain the remainder in
such cases.
(4) X to T in trust to accumulate the income during the
lives of A, B, and C, and on the death of the last
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survivor to divide the principal and income among
the children of A, B, and C who attain the age of 25.
Although there is no life estate preceding the gift to the
children, there is a measuring period of selected lives and
under the statute we determine the validity of the gift to
the children by considering the facts at the death of the
survivor of A, B, and C; thus it is possible for the gift
to be valid if there are no afterborn children or if they
are all over four years old at the death of the measuring
lives.
(5) X by his will leaves property to T in trust, the in-
come to be accumulated until the youngest of X's
grandchildren attains the age of 30; at that time
the corpus of the trust shall be divided equally among
such of X's grandchildren as are then living.
If at the time of X's death he leaves children surviving
him, the contingent gift to the grandchildren attaining
thirty is too remote because of the possibility of afterborn
grandchildren. However, under the statute it may be possi-
ble to consider the facts at the time of the death of the
children of X, and if at that time it appears there were no
grandchildren born after the death of X, or if all the grand-
children, including those born after the death of X, are
over four years old at the time of the death of the last
child, the gift possibly may be valid. Although there are
no life estates and no selected lives mentioned in the above
limitation, the children in fact are lives in being so that the
facts existing at the time of their death should be con-
sidered. In applying the Rule at Common Law the courts
would consider the children as measuring lives, and it is
submitted that in any case in which, in applying the Rule
at Common Law, the courts would consider lives of per-
sons as part of the measuring period we should, under the
statute, look to the facts at the time of the termination of
those lives. 7
The last sentence of this subsection merely defines a
life estate so as to include any estate which is not certain
to terminate sooner than the death of some person, the
so-called terminable life estate.
6 This may be doubtful because the children do not have life estates and
are not mentioned or identified in the instrument, but they are lives in
being, and it seems to me, should be considered as satisfying the require-
ments of the statute. See Leach, Perpetuities Legiskation, Massachusetts
Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349, 1359 (1954).
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(6) X to T in trust to pay the income to X's wife W,
if she survives him, for the term of her natural life
or until she remarries, and upon the happening of
either event to distribute the proceeds among their
grandchildren who attain 25.
The estate given to W is a life estate even though it may
terminate prior to her death, and the facts existing at the
termination of the estate may be considered in applying
the Rule.
This subsection does not apply where there are no
life estates or measuring lives; thus a gift to A and his
heirs followed by a gift over to B and his heirs upon a
remote contingency, such as the violation of restrictions on
the use of the property, is not affected by the statute and
the gift over is still a violation of the Rule.s Similarly,
gifts which are expressly contingent on the probate of a
will or the administration of the testator's estate are not
affected by the statute and may be held void under the
Rule. 9
Subsection (b) of the statute provides:
"Reduction of age contingency to twenty-one. If an
interest in real or personal property would violate the
rule against perpetuities as modified by subsection
(a) of this section because such interest is contingent
upon any person attaining or failing to attain an age
in excess of twenty-one, the age contingency shall be
reduced to twenty-one as to all persons subject to
the same age contingency.
90
This subsection is also identical with the provision in the
Massachusetts statute,9 and is similar to a provision in
the English Law of Property Act of 1925.9" The purpose of
the provision is to provide for the many instances in which
limitations violate the Rule because the testator or grantor
has made his gift contingent on the takers attaining an age
greater than twenty-one. Thus, in the first, fourth, fifth,
and sixth examples stated above in the discussion of sub-
section (a), if there are afterborn children or grand-
8 Such interests were void under the Common Law application of the
Rule and remain so under the statute. At Common Law there is an
exception where the gift is to one charity followed by a gift over to a
second charity; in Maryland, by statute, the gift over is valid even though
It is to an individual, provided the first taker is a charity. See supra at
283, ns. 78 and 79.
8 Supra, at 274, n. 27.
02 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (b).
" 6 MAss. LAws ANNO., Ch. 184A, § 2.
91 Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 163.
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children who have not attained the age of four at the
termination of the life estate or lives, the gift to them
would be void except for this provision which then comes
into operation and by reducing the stated age to twenty-
one saves the gift. The section does not provide for
splitting the class but treats all members of the group
alike merely reducing the stated age to twenty-one. How-
ever, if the stated age is valid as to some parts of the
disposition and invalid as to other portions, the section is
applied only to those parts which would be invalid. Also
subsection (b) is applied only if after applying subsection
(a) the stated age still makes the gift invalid; in other
words subsection (a) is applied first and then subsection
(b) if necessary to save the gift.
The remaining subsections of the act relate to the
application of the statute and make no changes in the
Rule other than those already mentioned. Subsection (c)93
provides that the act shall apply to both legal and equitable
interests. Since the Rule itself applies to both types of
interests, it is necessary for the statute to apply to both
types of interests. Subsection (d)" limits the application
of the act so as not to invalidate or modify the terms of
any limitation which would have been valid prior to its
passage. The statute is designed to validate certain in-
terests, which would have been void at Common Law,
through the use of a modified "wait and see" principle
which allows the court to take a look at the facts, or by
modifying the limitation where the stated age makes the
gift invalid, and is not intended to change the Rule gen-
erally; this section makes that clear by providing that any
limitation which is good under the Common Law inter-
pretation of the Rule is not affected by the act. Subsection
(e)95 is the usual severability clause common in modern
legislation; it is inserted to avoid any possible constitu-
tional difficulties. Subsection (f) 98 is also designed to avoid
constitutional problems which might arise if the statute
were given a broader application. In general it limits the
application of the act to instruments which take effect
after the effective date of the statute; this is clear as to
inter vivos instruments97 and wills9" but with respect to
powers of appointment a further explanation is necessary.
2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (c).
'2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (d).
2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (e).
2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (f).
G2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (f) (1).
'2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 16, § 197A (f) (2).
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The statute provides that it shall be applicable to ap-
pointments made after the effective date of the act, in-
cluding appointments by inter vivos instruments or wills
under powers created before that date.9 In view of the
traditional theory that the exercise of a power is merely
an event which causes the transfer to take effect under
the instrument creating the power, it might seem as if the
act were being given a retroactive operation. However,
that is not really the case; the traditional theory concern-
ing powers is not universally applied. It is used by the
courts only in some instances in order to explain certain
results; it is merely a fiction, not a fact.10 Actually two
things are necessary in order to transfer property subject
to a power of appointment: one is the creation of the power
by the donor, and the other is the exercise of the power
by the donee. Both events are essential to the transfer,
and there is no reason why the rules regulating the exer-
cise of a power cannot be changed after the power has
been created. The act does not take away any rights of
the donor or the donee; it merely allows the court, in
applying the Rule to an appointment made by the donee
after the statute becomes effective, to use the new approach
provided in the statute. it is believed there are no con-
stitutional problems in applying the statute in such cases.
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Having surveyed briefly the Rule in its Common Law
applications, the current statutory reforms, and the Mary-
land law, past and present, the time has come to draw con-
clusions and make recommendations.
The Rule, as it was developed in England and applied
by the courts in this country, has deserved much of the
criticism which has been directed at it. Although there is
undoubtedly need for some restriction on the freedom of
disposition, it is questionable whether the Rule serves its
purpose at the present time. As we have seen, within the
limits of the Rule, absurd and useless dispositions may be
made; it does not prevent settlors and testators from tying
up property and imposing their own peculiar ideas re-
"2 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art 16, § 197A (f) (3).
This theory of the operation of powers is frequently referred to as the
"relation back" doctrine. The courts speak of reading the exercise of the
power back into the instrument creating the power and treating the
exercise as if it were part of the instrument creating the power; but this
theory is not carried to its logical conclusion in all cases. Jones, The Rule
Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of Appointment in Maryland,
18 Md. L. Rev. 93, 100-5 (1958).
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garding its use on succeeding generations. The "dead hand"
is still with us in spite of the Rule. On the other hand it
does impose a limit, albeit a rather long one, beyond which
property must be freed from control. The criticisms have
been directed mostly at the traps into which the unwary
frequently fall, and the fact that the ill advised person
may be defeated in his legitimate attempt to dispose of
his property. I am, therefore, in favor of the current
reforms, and I do not believe they will cause such diffi-
culties and complications as the original New York stat-
ute did for they do not attempt to provide a substitute for
the Rule but merely modify its application. We still have
the Rule, but in the future we shall apply it with a little
more sense and a little less guess work.
As stated above, the recent Maryland legislation does
not abolish the Rule; it does not change the measuring
period which still remains one of lives in being and twenty-
one years, plus possible periods of gestation. Although the
maximum period allowed under the Rule has been
criticized as being too long, it has worked fairly well over
the years; in fact much better than the shortened two lives
period of the New York statutes. It is, therefore, probably
best to continue with it rather than attempt to create a
new period.1' 1
The test for determining the validity of an interest is
also unchanged; the Rule continues to apply only to con-
tingent interests, vested interests being excluded. This
concept of "vestedness" has been a prolific source of liti-
gation; it is a very indefinite and intangible idea. There
is probably no such thing as a vested, as distinguished
from a contingent, interest in the abstract; it all depends
upon what problem is before the court. 2 This makes the
Rule difficult to apply, but it also makes for flexibility and
variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and is probably
such an inherent part of the Rule that it would be almost
impossible to abandon it so long as we retain the Rule it-
self.10
3
Neither does the statute change the effect of violating
the Rule; a violation still makes the entire gift void.
101 The only serious suggestion for a change in the measuring period for
the Rule Is the recommendation by the Law Reform Committee that an
alternative period, not exceeding eighty years, may be specified in the
instrument creating the limitation. Supra at 279-280, n. 58.
102 See Jones, Vested and Contingent Remainders, A Suggestion With
Respect to Legal Method, 8 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1943).
10For a suggestion that the vesting test should be abandoned, see
Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? 56 Mich.
L. Rev. 683, 887 (1958).
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There has been much criticism of this application of the
Rule, and the "cy pres" type of statute attempts to avoid
such a result by giving the court the power to rephrase
the limitation, within the limits allowed by the Rule, so
as to carry out as nearly as possible the intent of the testa-
tor or settlor. Though there are many arguments in favor
of such an approach, it gives the court very broad authority
to remake the dispositions where a violation has occurred
and for this reason was rejected by the English commis-
sion.104 If the experience in jurisdictions adopting the "cy
pres" type of statute proves successful, the Maryland stat-
ute can easily be amended to include such power.
The Maryland act will allow the court to take account
of the facts existing at the termination of the life estates
or lives in being, and thus uphold many limitations for-
mally declared invalid. But it does not go as far as the full
"wait and see" principle, and will not tie up property for
longer than a lifetime; the possibility that such may
happen is one of the objections to the "wait and see" type
of statute.105
There are a number of instances which are violations of
the Rule at Common Law which the Maryland legislation
does not affect. Among these are limitations contingent
upon the administration of the testator's estate, contingent
gifts following a life estate in an unborn widow, unlimited
options, gifts to classes, where the contingency is an event
other than attaining a stated age, executory interests con-
tingent upon an uncertain event, and possibilities of re-
verter or rights of entry. In none of these cases does the
Maryland statute specifically apply. If, however, there is
a preceding life estate or measuring lives then the statute
may offer some assistance by allowing the court to consider
the facts at the time of the termination of the life estate
or lives. The full "wait and see" principle does give relief
in the above situations, although there may be difficulties
in determining the measuring period in some of the cases.
Many of the statutes specifically deal with one or more of
the above situations, and it would seem desirable that they
should be provided for. A simple statute could limit the
administrative contingency events to a reasonable period,
not exceeding twenty-one years, and validate such gifts.1°6
The same could be done for options, other than those in
104 Supra at 280-281, n. 62.
10- Supra at 278-279, n. 56.
'W40 McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS ANNo. (1945) § 11-b (4) ; 49 McKINNEY'S
CoNsoL. LAWS ANNo. (1945) § 42-c (4).
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leases. 07 The unborn widow problem could be remedied
by providing that such phrases shall refer only to per-
sons in being at the death of the testator.'0  Whether the
splitting of classes or contingencies should be allowed is,
perhaps, more questionable. 1°9 Validating executory in-
terests, even for a relatively short period, has the dis-
advantage of making the preceding estate unmarketable,
and, therefore, is probably not desirable." 0 As for possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry, their existence for
long periods also has the effect of making the preceding
estates unmarketable and in many instances unusable. It
would, therefore, seem desirable to put a limit on such in-
terests as has been done in some jurisdictions."'
Although the recent Maryland statute reforming the
Rule is, I believe, a step in the right direction, it probably
should be supplemented by specific provisions designed to
provide for the situations just mentioned.
"'See the suggestions regarding options in LAW REFORM COMMITTEE,
FOURTH REPORT (1956) 35-8; options in leases are exempt from the
Rule. See "ipra at 273, n. 18.
1 See the suggestion in LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT
(1956) 28; 40 MoKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS ANNO. (1945) § 11-b (3);
49 McKIxNEY's CONsoL. LAWS ANNO. (1945) § 42-c (3). Since the widbw
in most instances is given a life estate, a contingent gift over can
usually be upheld under the Maryland statute by the court considering
the facts at that time.
19 The report of the LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, FOuRTH REPORT (1956)
24-5 approves the splitting of classes.
no See, Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachu8etts Style, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1349, 1354-5 (1954). This raises serious questions regarding the
desirability of the Maryland statute validating such an interest where it
is in the form of a gift over to an individual following a gift to a charity.
Supra at 283, ns. 78 and 79, also at 287, n. 88. Also the statutes establishing
a procedure for enforcing such restrictions and conditions even though the
gifts over are too remote under the Rule. Ibid.
I Such Interests are as objectionable as executory interests when they
are unlimited as to time and should be given similar treatment. See, 6
MASS. LAWS ANNO., Ch. 184A, § 3 which limits such interests to a term
of thirty years; LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT (1956) 39;
Leach, supra n. 110, at 1362-4.
